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Abstract
We analyse the optimal pricing choice of an incumbent ﬁrm that sells
a good with network externalities and is threatened by the entry of a
higher quality variant. In the framework of a vertical diﬀerentiation
model, we ﬁnd a necessary and suﬃcient condition under which quality
improvement occurs as a result of this competition.
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In this paper, we analyze a network industry in which an incumbent faces
potential competition by a high quality brand. The incumbent beneﬁts from
the size of its installed base and decides whether or not to bar the entry of the
higher quality brand and consequently, whether or not quality improvement
takes place. The aim of this paper is to identify a necessary and suﬃcient
condition under which quality improvements are spontaneously introduced, in
spite of the existence of network eﬀects.
It is frequently argued that the presence of network eﬀects in an industry
slows down technological progress. This occurs because consumers tend to
prefer a good that is already in the market with an installed base rather than
a new product without installed base, even if this product results from a less
expensive technology. In this case, as argued by Shy (1996), the speed of tech-
nology adoption diﬀers from the speed of technology innovation. We examine
an analogous question for the case of quality innovation: in the presence of
network eﬀects, does the adoption path of higher quality goods diﬀer from
their innovation path? Clearly network eﬀects should dampen the willingness
of consumers to consume a new, higher quality product, simply because the
existing one, even when of smaller quality, does beneﬁtf r o mt h ei n s t a l l e db a s e .
T h ee n t r a n ts h o u l dp r o v i d ean e wb r a n dw h o s eq u a l i t ys u ﬃciently exceeds the
quality of the old one in order to compensate this dampening eﬀect, and induce
consumers to switch to the better variant.
In order to understand the trade oﬀ between higher quality and network
eﬀect, we develop a two-stage business model in which an incumbent sells
in the ﬁrst period a certain good whose characteristics include the fact that
consumers buying it in the second period may enjoy network externalities.
We introduce heterogeneity in consumer’s valuation for the goods in a vertical
diﬀerentiation model and analyze the optimal behavior of an incumbent when
a new product of higher quality becomes available in the second period. The
main diﬀerence from traditional models of vertical product diﬀerentiation is
t h ep r e s e n c eo fn e t w o r ke ﬀects. The consumers are not unanimous in their
preferences for the high quality good, even when prices are equal. Due to the
network externality, at equal prices, some agents may prefer to exploit the
network eﬀect by buying a low quality good, rather than enjoying the beneﬁts
1of a higher quality one1.W e i d e n t i f y a s u ﬃcient and necessary condition
under which the incumbent prefers to accommodate the higher quality brand
in equilibrium rather than barring its entry. This condition says that the
intensity of network eﬀects on consumers’ preferences should not exceed twice
the diﬀerential of intrinsic qualities existing between the two variants.
It is important to highlight the kind of goods that our analysis compre-
hends. As mentioned above, we consider a two stage model where the network
takes one period of time to become eﬀective. We consider therefore a delayed
network eﬀect.2 Also we assume that agents buy only in one period and cannot
delay consumption. Our analysis is, in particular, appropriate for reputation
goods, or goods which require a learning period. For instance, consider the
market for a reputation good when reputation increases with the size of its
market. The initial buyers of such a good spread information about how they
enjoy its consumption, and often create a core of fans who praise its qual-
ity and virtues. The set of consumers who buy the good can be viewed as
a network, improving the utility of its potential consumers and thereby the
potential proﬁts’ opportunities of the ﬁrm selling the good. This is the case of
several products resulting from recent innovation, and whose characteristics
c a no n l yb er e v e a l e db yd i r e c tc o n s u m p t i o n .T h el a r g e rt h es e to fi n i t i a lb u y -
ers, the larger the utility subsequent buyers expect to obtain. Also for many
goods, the size of the initial network of buyers determines the availability of
complementary services the seller would be willing to develop around the vari-
ant which is initially supplied. Examples are: a new durable good and the
number of shops which increases with the number of its consumers; a new ma-
chine and the number of its components when they are available to subsequent
buyers, like in the case of a computer whose number of compatible programs
increases with the number of its initial buyers; or, more generally, any good
whose quality increases through time when the number of its buyers increases.
In all such cases, the utility of the subsequent buyers for the good increases
with the network size of its initial buyers. Notice however that such product
improvements or reputation eﬀects need some period of time to be ﬁnalized,
creating a time lag between the creation of the network, and its eﬀect on the
1The idea of analysing network eﬀects in the framework of a vertically diﬀerentiated
industry is not new (see, in particular, Baake and Boome (1999) and Bental and Spiegel
(1995).
2The study of network externalities has been introduced for the ﬁrst time in Rohlfs (1974).
2utility of subsequent buyers.
The problem of the trade oﬀ between technology improvement and net-
work eﬀect has been treated previously by several authors. Farrell and Sa-
loner (1986), Katz and Shapiro (1992), Shy (1996) and Fudenberg and Tirole
(2000) are all concerned with the problem of quality improvement. However,
they do not use the vertical diﬀerentiation model to represent how the trade oﬀ
between technology improvement and network eﬀect operates.3 The above au-
thors all assume that consumers have the same preferences.4 This implies that
as soon as the new quality becomes available all consumers (or none) adopt it,
depending on the magnitude of the network eﬀect at the time of innovation.
By contrast, we assume in our approach that consumers are heterogeneous.
Speciﬁcally, this heterogeneity allows that, at identical prices, some consumers
prefer the old technology with an installed base and lower quality, while others
prefer the new technology without installed base. The individual preferences
of consumers in the vertical diﬀerentiation model rely on a small number of
parameters capturing the essentials of the trade oﬀ between network eﬀects
and quality. This is the reason why we are able to identify precisely how
the optimal strategies of the incumbent are depending on these parameters
and, beyond that, when it is optimal (for him) to accommodate entry and
open the door for quality improvement. There are several other signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between these models and ours. All these papers consider an inﬁ-
nite horizon model in which a new technology becomes available at a certain
deﬁned period, while we assume initially a two-period model and show that
the conclusions obtained can be extended to an inﬁnite horizon. Shy (1996)
models the result of technology improvement as an increase in the stand-alone
value. With this respect, Shy’s approach is close to ours even though he does
not take into account the consequences of this improvement on prices and,
3Baake and Boom (1999) and Bental and Spiegel (1995) have also combined the use of
a vertical product diﬀerentiation model with network externalities. However, Baake and
Boom (1999) focus on compatibility decisions, without addressing the quality improvement
problem. Similarly Bental and Spiegel (1995) analyse the market coverage issue when net-
work eﬀects are present in a static framework. The closest approach to ours is Gabszewicz,
Pepall and Thisse (1992), who examine the entry problem when there are switching costs in
a vertical product diﬀerentiation context.
4In fact, Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) assume the existence of two types of consumers;
however, they are homogeneous in their preferences for the technological improvement and
diﬀer only in their stand-alone values.
3accordingly, the market participation constraint is not active.5 Furthermore,
as stated above, consumers are assumed to be homogeneous in their tastes
for quality improvement. Katz and Shapiro (1992) model technological im-
provement through a decrease in production costs while we assume a higher
stand-alone value for the new product; they analyze the pricing strategies and
the timing of product introduction. Their ﬁndings are the following: when
technologies are compatible, pricing is the result of a Bertrand game with dif-
ferentiated costs since technological progress reduces the entrant’s cost. When
technologies are incompatible the incumbent sets his price so as to make con-
sumers indiﬀerent between buying immediately upon arrival in the market, or
delaying their purchase until the entry of the new technology. The incumbent
is never able to deter entry if the opponent sells a compatible product. On
the contrary, if the new product is incompatible, entry deterrence is possi-
ble. Therefore, the incumbent can deter entry with certainty by denying the
entrant the possibility to sell a compatible product. In our model, entry deter-
rence is obtained through the level of prices set in initial periods, rather than
through the compatibility decision. Farrell and Saloner (1986) analyze the
possibility that the incumbent prevents entry by the rival through predatory
pricing; however they do not discuss the conditions under which it arises. Fu-
denberg and Tirole (2000) develop a model of limit pricing based on the idea
that the installed base of a network good can ﬁll a preemptive role similar to
that of investment in physical capacity. In their model a sequence of potential
entrants threatens the incumbent monopoly power and leads to possible entry
deterrence strategy. If entry occurs, all consumers prefer the improved good
and this drives the price of the incumbent to the point where he is indiﬀerent
between deterring entry or not. In our case technological progress is modeled
by the creation of a new product with higher quality but a certain degree of
substitutability. Price competition does not drive the incumbent’s proﬁtt o
t h ep o i n tw h e r eh ei si n d i ﬀerent between deterring entry or not, because goods
are vertically diﬀerentiated. Also, in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) entry de-
terrence is always possible due to the existence of an entry cost. In our model,
5Shy (1996) considers technologies to be supplied at competitive prices and accordingly he
does not analyse price decisions. He also treats the possibility that a monopolist produces
the technology and its improvements, however he does not consider the possibility of a
threatening opponent.
4there is no entry cost and thus entry deterrence is necessarily the result of the
pricing policy pursued during initial periods.
We describe the model in section 2. Section 3 analyses when this deterrence
of the quality improvement does not take place. Some ﬁnal remarks and
avenues for further research are gathered in the conclusion.
2 The model
Consider the market for a good with positive network externalities, say good 1,
sold in period 1 by a monopolist at constant average cost normalized to 0.T h e
monopolist is assumed to be protected against entry by a patent during period
1, but free entry is assumed to be authorized in the next period. Moreover,
we assume that the life cycle of product 1 does not extend beyond the end
of period 2. In each period there is a cohort of consumers, indexed by a
parameter v uniformly distributed on [0,1], entering the market. In period 1,
these consumers, who are assumed to buy at most one unit of the good, obtain
utility only from its stand-alone value: the network eﬀect generated by good 1
takes one period of time to become eﬀective. Thus consumers who acquire the
good in the ﬁrst period do not beneﬁt from the network externality due to the
delay in the network eﬀect. Consequently, the utility for consumer v in period
1 for buying good 1 is simply given by β1v − p11, with β1 > 0 measuring the
quality of product 1, and p11 t h ep r i c es e tb yt h ei n c u m b e n ti np e r i o d1 .
In the second period, a new, higher intrinsic quality good, say good 2,
becomes available for sale by an entrant, ﬁrm 2. We shall also assume a
zero average cost for producing good 2. The stand alone value of good 2 for
consumer v is given by β2v. We assume throughout that β2 ≥ 4β1. The utility
of type v consumer in period 2 for buying product 2 at price p22 is given by
β2v−p22. Notice that even if we conduct the analysis as if product 2 does not
generate network eﬀects in the subsequent period, we shall later explain that
this assumption does not aﬀect the conclusion of our analysis.
Now, the cohort of consumers entering the market in period 2 and buying
good 1 not only enjoy its stand alone value, but also its network value, gener-
ated in the previous period. We assume that all consumers value the network
eﬀect in the same way through a parameter α. Consequently, the utility of
buying product 1 in period 2 for consumer v writes as β1v +αD11(p11)−p12,
5with p12 denoting the price of good 1 in period 2 and D11(p11) t h es i z eo fﬁrst
period sales. Thus, in period 2, competition takes place between two ﬁrms: the
incumbent, ﬁrm 1, selling product 1 and enjoying its network eﬀects resulting
from its ﬁrst period sales and the entrant, ﬁrm 2, selling a higher intrinsic
quality product. Deﬁne the quality index of product i as the utility obtained
by consumer of type v =1at zero prices when he consumes product i.A c -
c o r d i n g l y ,t h eq u a l i t yi n d e xo fg o o d1i np e r i o d2i sg i v e nb yβ1+ αD11(p11)
while the quality index of good 2 is equal to β2.
In the ﬁrst period, the incumbent is alone in the market and sells only





The monopolist serves the market in the interval [
p11
β1 ,1]. The proﬁto ft h e








The incumbent anticipates the entry by ﬁrm 2. The goods sold by ﬁrm 1 and
2 are exogenously diﬀerentiated in quality, but also endogenously diﬀerenti-
ated, due to the ﬁrst mover advantage of ﬁrm 1. This advantage allows the
incumbent to manipulate the quality of its product sold in period 2 through
the choice of its ﬁrst period price. In the ﬁrst period, the incumbent sets
price p11 and, in the second period, he competes in prices with the entrant.
In the second period, we assume that these prices are determined at a price
equilibrium of the corresponding game. However, ﬁrm 1, anticipating entry
by ﬁrm 2, is able to control, through the ﬁrst period price p11, the competitive
conditions in the market in period 2: depending on whether p11 is high or low,
few or many consumers buy the good in period 1, and the resulting network
created in the ﬁrst period is small or large.
Several elements can inﬂuence consumers’ choice in the second period: the
quality diﬀerential between the two variants, β2 − β1, the intensity of the
network eﬀect α, the pricing policy p11 of the incumbent in the ﬁrst period
and, ﬁnally, the prices p12 and 22 chosen by both ﬁrms in the second period.
Traditional models of vertical diﬀerentiation are characterized by the fact that
at identical prices all consumers rank in the same way the diﬀerent qualities.
6This property is no longer satisﬁed in the presence of network externalities.
This occurs because the network externality brings a diﬀerent source of quality
diﬀerentiation that is independent of the type of consumer. Low types are
induced to buy product 1.
Denote by v1(p12,p 22;p11) the consumer who is indiﬀerent between buying
good 1 or good 2 in the second period. The value v1(p12,p 22;p11) is the
solution to the equation
β1v + αD11 (p11) − p12 = β2v − p22,
which implies that v1(p12,p 22;p11)=
p22−p12+αD11(p11)
β2−β1 . If α is taken to be 0,t h e
value v1(p12,p 22;p11) corresponds to the indiﬀerent consumer in the traditional
model of vertical diﬀerentiation. In the present case, the indiﬀerent consumer
is shifted by
αD11(p11)
β2−β1 , a measure of the relative weight of the two sources of
quality diﬀerentiation. The consumer indiﬀerent between buying good 1 or
not buying at all is given by v2(p12),which is the solution to













Figure 1: The marginal consumers
For both demands to be strictly positive and smaller than 1 we must have
that 0 <v 2 <v 1 < 1, which is equivalent to
p22 − p12 + αD11 (p11) − (β2 − β1) < 0 (3)
p12β2 − p22β1 − αD11 (p11)β2 < 0 (4)
p12 − αD11 (p11) > 0 (5)
7Within the area of prices (p12,p 22) deﬁned by the previous inequalities, we
h a v et h a tt h ed e m a n di np e r i o d2f o rg o o d1 is given by
D12 (p12,p 22;p11)=
p22 − p12 + αD11 (p11)
β2 − β1
−
p12 − αD11 (p11)
β1
, (6)
while the demand for good 2 obtains as
D22(p12,p 22;p11)=1−
p22 − p12 + αD11 (p11)
β2 − β1
. (7)
Condition 5 guarantees that there exist some consumers who buy neither of
the two products in the market: the market is uncovered. When the reverse
inequality holds, all consumers buy one of the products: the market is covered.
In that case, demands are given by
D12 (p12,p 22;p11)=




p22 − p12 + αD11 (p11)
β2 − β1
. (9)
Notice that in the traditional model of vertical diﬀerentiation, with consumer
types distributed over the interval [0,1], the market would never be covered
at positive prices in a duopoly industry. This is so because the lowest-type
consumer only buys if the price is set to be zero: his valuation is indeed
equal to zero. When network eﬀects are present, the consumer type zero buys
even at positive prices, in order to beneﬁt from the network. It is therefore
necessary to distinguish whether after entry, demands correspond to that of

















































For the quality improvement resulting from the introduction of good 2
to take place, it is needed that the marginal consumer v1 corresponding to




11) <β 2 −β1, with the pair (p∗
12,p ∗
22) denoting equilibrium
values of prices in the second period and p∗
11 the optimal price in period 1.
8The subsequent analysis aims at identifying a necessary and suﬃcient con-
dition to allow product improvement.
3 Equilibrium analysis
In this section we analyze the general case in order to identify the conditions
under which quality improvement does actually take place. As mentioned
above, the incumbent is able to drive the second period market equilibrium
through its choice of ﬁrst period price. In other words, the size of the network
that he chooses to constitute is determinant in the market conditions that the
entrant faces. Moreover, the incumbent might be interested in practising an
aggressive strategy to limit entry by the opponent (the so-called limit pricing
strategy). Starting with the second period market subgame, two possibilities
might be pursued by the incumbent: either to allow entry, or to deter it.6
3.1 Limit pricing
We examine ﬁrst the entry deterrence outcome. In order to deter entry, ﬁrm







− (β2 − β1)+p22
which cancels demand of ﬁrm 2 when it quotes a price equal to p22. Entry
deterrence occurs when D22 (p12,p 22)=0even if p22 =0 . Then, the candidate














− (β2 − β1)
pL
22 =0 .
We immediately notice that, whatever the price p11 in [0,β1] selected in the
ﬁrst period, pL
12 is smaller than 0 when α<β 2 − β1. Therefore no limit
pricing strategy exists for the incumbent in this area of the parameters: when
α is small relative to the diﬀerence in the intrinsic qualities, the cost of entry
6The reverse possibility where the entrant forces exit of the incumbent cannot arise. To
f o r c et h ee x i to ft h ei n c u m b e n tt h ee n t r a n ts h o u l dq u o t eap r i c es u c ht h a t ,e v e nw h e np12 =0 ,
demand of ﬁrm 1 could not be positive. However, even quoting p22 =0 ,D 12 > 0.
9deterrence is prohibitive for the incumbent. Consequently, when α<β 2 −β1,
whatever the price p11 selected by the incumbent in period 1, he is constrained
to accommodate entry in period 2.
On the contrary, when α ≥ β2 −β1, it is possible to practise limit pricing,






− (β2 − β1). The optimal
choice of the incumbent for ﬁrst period price is then given by the solution to















− (β2 − β1)
It is easily shown that the optimal admissible value for p11 is zero. 7 Thus,
at the optimal ﬁrst-period strategy, the incumbent obtains a total proﬁte q u a l
to α − (β2 − β1) when using his limit pricing strategy in period 2. We now
compute the incumbent’s optimal price proﬁle for the situation in which both
ﬁrms are active in the market.
3.2 Entry accommodation
I nt r a d i t i o n a lm o d e l so fv e r t i c a lp r o d u c td i ﬀerentiation, with types distributed
over the [0,1] interval, the market is always uncovered. In the presence of
network externalities it is however necessary to discuss whether the optimal
solution is to cover the market or not, since the existence of the network gives
ap o s i t i v eu t i l i t yt ot h el o w e s tt y p ee v e na tp o s i t i v ep r i c e s . T h ed i s t i n c t i o n
between a covered or uncovered market is important since demands are deﬁned
diﬀerently in one case or the other. This can be observed in Figure 2.
7The total proﬁt function is concave and attains its maximum at p11 =
1
2 (β1 − α). If
β2 > 4β1, as assumed in the model, the above value for p11 is negative and therefore, when









Figure 2: Covered and uncovered market.
Consider ﬁrst a pair of prices such that both ﬁrms are active in the market





























































with resulting candidate equilibrium prices
p∗
12 =



















11The price p12 is always positive while a suﬃcient condition for the price p22











+( β2 − β1)β1










(4β2 − β1)(β2 − β1)
.
The demand D12 (p∗
12,p ∗
22) is always positive while a suﬃcient condition for
D22 (p∗
12,p ∗
22) to be positive is again α ≤ 2(β2 − β1).F u r t h e r m o r e w e m u s t











































2 (β2 − β1)
.
We observe that the interior candidate price equilibrium is a function of the
price p11 selected by the incumbent in period 1, which determines the network
size in period 2.
Now assume that interior candidate equilibrium prices lead to a covered



























12The ﬁrst order conditions imply that at an interior candidate price equilibrium:




































+ β2 − β1
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In order to identify the optimal proﬁle of prices for the incumbent, we have
now to analyze his ﬁrst period optimal strategy both for the case of covered
and uncovered second-period market. We have assumed in the model that
β2 > 4β1. As it is shown in the proof of the following lemma, this assumption
gives a suﬃciently high intrinsic quality diﬀerential between the two goods in
order to induce the incumbent to create the largest network in the ﬁrst period
by quoting a zero price.
Lemma 3.1 When β2 − β1 <αand the incumbent accommodates entry of
ﬁrm 2, its optimal ﬁrst period price is given by p∗
11 =0 .
Proof: See the appendix.
From Lemma 4.1, it follows that, under entry accommodation, the in-
cumbent always chooses to maximize his installed base in the ﬁrst period by
quoting price zero, both in the case of covered and uncovered market. It is
easy to see however, that in the same domain, the condition (10) guarantee-
ing the existence of an uncovered market at equilibrium prices in period 2, is
never met when p11 =0 . Thus, we can rule out the possibility that the incum-
bent would drive the equilibrium path to an equilibrium with an uncovered
market in stage 2. Thus, under entry accommodation, only the total proﬁt
corresponding to a zero price in period 1 and the market coverage solution in
13period 2 has to be taken into account by the incumbent when deciding whether








3.3 Total proﬁtc o m p a r i s o n s
Now we can compare the total proﬁts under limit pricing and entry accommo-
dation, always having in mind to identify the optimal pricing proﬁle of the in-
cumbent. This comparison has to be performed only when α ∈ [β2 − β1,2(β2 − β1)].
Indeed, when α<β 2 − β1, no limit pricing is possible while, when α ≥
2(β2 − β1), no accommodation is possible at equilibrium since demand of
ﬁrm 2 is negative at equilibrium prices. It is easy to see that when α ∈




(α + β2 − β1)
2
β2 − β1
>α− (β2 − β1),
where the last term of this inequality represents the total proﬁtf o rt h ee n t r y
deterrence strategy: in the domain α ∈ [β2 − β1,2(β2 − β1)], the incumbent
gets a higher total proﬁt by accommodating entry than by practising a limit
pricing strategy (see Figure 3).
Consequently, for all α ∈ [0,2(β2 − β1)], the optimal strategy for the incum-
bent consists in accommodating entry. Thus we conclude:
Figure 3: Proﬁts under entry deterrence and entry accommodation.
14Proposition 3.1 An e c e s s a r ya n ds u ﬃcient condition for quality improve-
ment is
α ≤ 2(β2 − β1).
T h ei n t e n s i t yo ft h en e t w o r ke ﬀect in the preferences of the consumers
should not be too large compared with the intrinsic quality diﬀerential between
the two variants: otherwise entry deterrence would necessarily take place. In
fact, when α ≥ 2(β2 − β1), the diﬀerence between the network eﬀect intensity
α and the stand-alone values diﬀerential β2 −β1, makes it more advantageous
to the incumbent to prevent both products to compete with each other in the
second-period market. The size of the network eﬀect ampliﬁes the intrinsic
quality of the standard variant sold in period 1 to such an extent that it
becomes the product with the highest quality index in period 2. It is easy
to anticipate that lowering the amplitude of the network eﬀect below the
diﬀerential of the intrinsic quality parameters can make the use of the entry
deterrence strategy less attractive, and give room for quality improvement
adoption.
This result relates directly to the main ﬁndings in Garcia (2005). When a
monopolist sells a good with network externalities and has the possibility of
introducing a higher quality brand in the market, Garcia (2005) shows that
q u a l i t yi m p r o v e m e n tt a k e sp l a c ei fa n do n l yi ft h en e t w o r ki n t e n s i t y ,α,i s
smaller than the quality diﬀerential, β2 − β1. T h et h r e s h o l di st h u sh i g h e r
w h e nt h en e wq u a l i t yi ss o l db yar i v a lt h a ni fi ti ss o l db yt h em o n o p o l i s t
himself. Quality improvement is more likely under competition than under
monopoly and the reason is that, for some values of the network eﬀect, it is
too costly to deter the entry of a rival. On the contrary, under monopoly, it
is costless to deter the introduction of the high quality.
The above analysis has been conducted assuming that the life cycle of good
1 has two periods, and that good 2 would not generate network externalities
in subsequent periods. The ﬁrst assumption guarantees that the horizon of
the incumbent does not extend beyond period 2. Otherwise he would have
to take into account all subsequent periods when deﬁning his optimal pricing
strategy. The resulting increase in complexity would not be compensated by
the development of new insights in the problem. We will now argue that
the second assumption does not play any role in our main conclusion. When
α>2(β2 − β1), the incumbent practises limit pricing, which entails a zero
15demand for ﬁrm 2 and, accordingly, no network can be constituted having
eﬀect in subsequent periods. If α ≤ 2(β2 − β1), the incumbent is willing
to accommodate entry when the rival sells a good without network eﬀect in
the subsequent periods. If there would exist network eﬀects related to this
second good, the rival would certainly quote in the subsequent periods a lower
price in period 2 than the equilibrium price without network eﬀects which we
have identiﬁed above. In particular he could possibly set a price equal to zero
in order to create the largest installed base for period 3. Since the incumbent
accommodates entry in the latter situation, he will a fortiori accommodate
entry when his opponent can constitute a network. Thus, the condition α ≤
2(β2 − β1) remains necessary and suﬃcient for quality improvement. Notice
that if the condition α>2(β2 − β1) is satisﬁed, the entry of product 2 is
barred and ﬁrm 1 remains a monopolist over periods 1 and 2, disappearing
at the end of the latter. Assuming that the barred product can no longer
enter the market, product 3 is the only candidate for sale in period 3. When
the condition α>2(β4 − β3) also holds, ﬁrm 3 remains a monopolist over
periods 3 and 4, and disappears at the end of period 3. This reasoning can
be pursued for periods beyond period 4, as long as the condition for entry
deterrence is satisﬁed. The market structure is a sequence of monopolies with
eﬀective quality improvement arising every two periods due to the bounded
life cycle of the variants.
4W e l f a r e C o m p a r i s o n s
It is interesting to identify the circumstances under which the use of an accom-
modating strategy pareto-dominates the practise of limit pricing. This com-
parison is only meaningful in the domain of parameters in which the incum-
bent disposes of both possibilities, namely when α ∈ (β2 − β1,2(β2 − β1)).
Remind that the optimal ﬁrst period strategy of the incumbent always consists
in quoting p11 =0 . Accordingly, under limit pricing, the total surplus WLP












(β1v + α − p∗
12)dv + p∗
12 =
= α + β1,
16with CSLP
i denoting the consumers’ surplus of period i and ΠLP
i the proﬁto f

















































i denoting the consumers’ surplus of period i and ΠAcc
i the proﬁt
of period i under accommodation. The diﬀerence between the total surpluses
obtains as:




2 +5 α2 − 14α(β2 − β1)
β2 − β1
,
which is negative whenever α ∈
¡4
5 (β2 − β1),2(β2 − β1)
¢
and positive other-
wise. As an illustration, Figure 4 depicts the total surplus under limit pricing
and accommodation as a function of the network intensity parameter α for










5 (β2 − β1),2(β2 − β1)
¢
, it would be better from the welfare
point of view that only product 1 is available to consumers. However, at
17the equilibrium solution of period 2, the incumbent chooses to accommodate
entry when α ∈ ((β2 − β1),2(β2 − β1)), thus making the suboptimal decision
concerning its welfare consequences. In the referred domain, if total welfare is
decomposed into its consumers’ and ﬁrms’ components, the presence of both
products in the market leads to higher prices than in the limit pricing solution,
which tends to reduce consumers’ surplus. The positive diﬀerence in proﬁts
between accommodating and deterring does not compensate for the loss in
consumers’ surplus.
5C o n c l u s i o n
We have raised the question whether the existence of network eﬀects could
prevent the quality improvements resulting from the increase in the stand
alone value. Even if this issue has been treated previously in the literature, it
has never been examined in the context of a vertical product diﬀerentiation
model. This exploration enables us to identify a very simple necessary and
suﬃcient condition under which intrinsic quality improvements are eﬀectively
realized at equilibrium. This condition says that the intensity of the network
eﬀect should be smaller than twice the diﬀerential between the intrinsic qual-
ities of the entrant’s and incumbent’s variants. We have also shown that for
some combination of parameters, the monopolist’s decision concerning quality
improvement is suboptimal.
Several questions naturally arise from our work. One possibility would
consist in keeping the model considered in this paper and analyzing the dy-
namics of entry assuming that the condition for quality improvement is always
fulﬁlled. In this case, two products can simultaneously survive in the market
in each period, giving rise to a sequence of duopolistic market structures.
6 Appendix
Proof (Lemma 1): Assume ﬁrst that the market is uncovered; the proﬁt func-





















18This function is quadratic in p11 and concave (resp. convex) when α be-




β2 (β2 − β1)
4β2−β1
2β2−β1(resp. (ˆ α,∞)).
Whenever 4β2 − 13β1 > 0, ˆ α<β 2 − β1 and thus in the relevant domain the
function πtot (p11) is convex. The maximum must obtain at one of the bound-
aries of the admissible domain [0,β1] for p11. Comparing these proﬁts at the
two extreme values of the domain, it is easily seen that πtot (p11) is always
maximal at p∗
11 =0 .
Now assume that p11 e n t a i l sac o v e r e dm a r k e ti np e r i o d2 . T h e nt h e





















This function is convex whenever α>3
p
β1 (β2 − β1). In that case is easily
shown that the maximum is attained at p11 =0 . Assume ﬁrst that 3
p
β1 (β2 − β1) <
β2 − β1, in which case β2 > 10β1. Then for α ∈ [β2 − β1,2(β2 − β1)],
the proﬁt function is convex and p11 =0 . Now assume that β2 − β1 <
3
p
β1 (β2 − β1) < 2(β2 − β1),i nw h i c hc a s e13





β1 (β2 − β1),2(β2 − β1)
i





β1 (β2 − β1)
i
the proﬁt function is concave and its ﬁrst deriv-
ative vanishes at p11 = 1
2β1
2α(α+(β2−β1))−9β1(β2−β1)
α2−9β1(β2−β1) , which is negative in the
relevant domain of parameters. Accordingly, the optimal value of p11 is once
again 0.Q E D
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